Abstract-While the Internet of things (IoT) promises to improve areas such as energy efficiency, health care, and transportation, it is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. In particular, DDoS attacks work by overflowing the bandwidth of a server. But many IoT devices form part of cyber-physical systems (CPS). Therefore, they can be used to launch a "physical" denial-ofservice attack (PDoS) in which IoT devices overflow the "physical bandwidth" of a CPS. In this paper, we quantify the populationbased risk to a group of IoT devices targeted by malware for a PDoS attack. To model the recruitment of bots, we extend a traditional game-theoretic concept and create a "Poisson signaling game." Then we analyze two different mechanisms (legal and economic) to deter botnet recruitment. We find that 1) defenders can bound botnet activity and 2) legislating a minimum level of security has only a limited effect, while incentivizing active defense can decrease botnet activity arbitrarily. This work provides a quantitative foundation for designing proactive defense against PDoS attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE IOT AND PDOS ATTACKS
The Internet of things (IoT) is a "dynamic global network infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities based on standard and interoperable communication protocols where physical and virtual 'things' have identities, physical attributes, and virtual personalities" [2] . Unpacking this definition, we can highlight three features of the IoT: it is 1) decentralized, 2) heterogeneous, and 3) connected to the physical world. The IoT is decentralized because nodes have "self-configuring capabilities," some amount of local intelligence, and incentives which are not aligned with the other nodes. It is heterogeneous because diverse "things" constantly enter and leave the IoT, facilitated by "standard and interoperable communication protocols." Finally, IoT devices are connected to the physical world, i.e., they are part of cyber-physical systems (CPS). They may influence behavior, control the flow of traffic, and optimize home lighting.
A. Difficulties in Securing the Internet of Things
While the IoT promises gains in efficiency, customization, and communication ability, it also raises new challenges. One of these challenges is security. IoT devices are often designed without security in mind. The social aspect of IoT devices also makes them vulnerable to attack through social engineering. 
) Botnet herder uses
IoT devices (e.g., HVAC controllers) to deplete the bandwidth of a cyber-physical service (e.g., electrical power).
Moreover, the dynamic and heterogeneous attributes of the IoT create a large attack surface. Once compromised, these "things" can also be used as vectors for attack. The most notable example has been the Mirai botnet attack on Dyn in 2016. Approximately 100,000 bots-largely belonging to the (IoT)-participated in an unprecedented attack against the domain name server (DNS) for Twitter, Reddit, Github, and the New York Times. Outages at these websites lasted for over two hours [13] .
B. Denial of Cyber-Physical Service Attacks
In general, DDoS attacks work by overflowing some type of cyber-layer bandwidth of their targets. But many IoT devices are part of CPS. Therefore, in addition to cyber-layer resources, IoT devices also draw upon physical-layer resources.
As one example, consider the navigation app Wayz [1] . Wayz uses real-time traffic information to attempt to find optimal navigation routes. Due to its large number of users, Wayz also influences traffic. Potentially, if too many users are directed to a given road, they can consume all of the physical bandwidth of that road and cause unexpected congestion. Intelligent adversaries could manipulate Wayz reports in order to deliberately cause congestion.
Another example can be found in healthcare. Smart lighting systems (which deploy, e.g., time-of-flight sensors) can sense when room occupants fall [18] . These systems can be used to alert emergency responders about a medical emergency in an assisted living center or the home of someone who is aging. But an attacker could potentially trigger many of these alerts at the same time. This could deplete the response bandwidth of emergency personnel.
We call such an attack a denial of cyber-physical service attack. To distinguish the physical-layer attack from a cyberlayer DDoS, we also use the acronym PDoS (Physical Denial of Service). In the rest of the paper, we will consider one specific instance of a PDoS attack, although our analysis is not limited to this particular example.
Our PDoS example is the infection and manipulation of a large number of IoT-based heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) controllers, in order to cause a sudden addition of load to the power grid. An attacker uses the HVAC controllers to "flood" the electrical grid with power load. Since energy companies look to IoT HVAC devices to perform peak shifting and demand response [5] , sudden power loads from infected devices can impose costs. Figure 1 gives a conceptual diagram of a PDoS attack. Our defense mechanism targets the third stage in particular. We model an attacker who scans a wide range of IP addresses, looking for devices with weak security settings. We envision malware similar to Mirai, which attempts a simple brute force attack. Mirai checks for a list of factory-default usernames and passwords (e.g. root/admin, admin/admin, root/123456) [10] , [8] .
C. Modeling the PDoS Recruitment Stage
The essence of the recruitment process is scanning a population of IP addresses at a low cost. In order to quantify the risk of malware infection, we create a game-theoretic model. Game theory provides a set of tools to measure strategic interactions between multiple parties with possibly misaligned incentives. Parties in game theory are assumed to act intelligently and in their own self-interest. This makes game theory a good condidate to quantify the decentralized and vulnerable IoT.
In particular, we combine two game-theoretic models known as signaling games [11] , [12] , [6] and Poisson games [15] , [16] . Signaling games model interactions between two parties, one of which possesses information unknown to the other party. While signaling games consider only two players, we extend this model by allowing the number of target IoT devices to be a random variable (r.v.) that follows a Poisson distribution. This captures the fact that the malware scans a large number of targets. Moreover, we allow the targets to have heterogeneous abilities to detect malicious login attempts.
D. Contributions and Related Work
We make the following principle contributions: 1) We propose a type of IoT malware attack called a denial of cyber-physical services (PDoS) attack, which consumes bandwidth of a physical resource in a CPS.
2) We develop a model called Poisson signaling games
(PSG) to quantify the population-based risk of malware infection. This model requires extending signaling games for cases of an unknown number of heterogeneous receivers. 3) We find the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the PSG model for PDoS. 4) We analyze legal and economic mechanisms to deter botnet recruitment. 5) In equilibrium, we find that 1) defenders can bound botnet activity, and 2) legislating a minimum level of security has only a limited effect, while incentivizing active defense can decrease botnet activity arbitrarily.
1) Related Work: PSG build on a series of existing models for Poisson games and signaling games [11] , [6] , [17] , [15] . Wu et al. use game theory to design defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks [19] . But the defense mechanisms relate to mitigating the actual attack (the flood of traffic against a target system), while we focus on botnet recruitment. Bensoussan et al. use a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model to study the growth of a botnet [4] . But IoT devices in our model maintain beliefs about the reliability of incoming messages, some of which are issued by malware attempting to recruit devices for a botnet. In this way, our paper considers the need to trust legitimate messages. Finally, load altering attacks [14] , [3] to the power grid are an example of PDoS attacks. But PDoS attacks can also deal with other resources.
2) Outline of the Paper: In Section II, we propose PSG to quantify the population risk due to PDoS attacks. Section III obtains the equilibrium in all parameter regimes of the model. Some of these equilibria are harmful for power companies and IoT users. Therefore, we design proactive mechanisms to improve the equilibria in Section IV. We underline the key contributions of the paper in Section V.
II. POISSON SIGNALING GAMES
In this section, we model PDoS using PSG. Figure 2 depicts a PSG, and Table I summarizes the nomenclature.
A. Poisson Signaling Game Structure
Signaling games are a class of dynamic, two-player, information asymmetric games between a sender S and a receiver R ( [11] , [12] , [7] ). In our case, S represents either a user or a botnet scanner, which attempts to access an IoT HVAC device. R represents the device.
1) Signaling Games: S possesses some information called a type x ∈ X which is unknown to R. Here, x refers to whether S is legitimate, i.e., the intended user of the HVAC device (x = l), or deceptive, i.e., a botnet scan (x = d). Let the probability that S belongs to each type be denoted by q S (x). Based on her type, S chooses an action typically called a message m ∈ M. In our case, m refers to whether S attempts to login to the device (m = p) or withdraws, i.e., does not attempt to login (m = w). Our goal will be to force S of type d to drop out of the interaction: to play action w rather than action p. Based on m and e, each type of receiver chooses an action a.
2) Evidence: Next, R observes m, but does not know x with certainty. In typical signaling games (e.g. [6] , [11] , [12] ), R only uses m to form his belief about the likelihood with which S has each type x ∈ X. But in botnet recruitment, R observes additional evidence about whether login attempts are legitimate: the timing of failed login attempts, the source IP, etc. Therefore, we use an augmented model of signaling games called signaling games with evidence [17] , in which R observes exogenous evidence e ∈ E. The evidence can suggest that S is a legitimate user (e = n) or that S is a botnet scanner (e = b).
3) Multiple and Heterogeneous Receivers: In addition, we consider multiple receivers. In other words, we allow S to attempt to login to multiple devices. This is the case when a botnet scanner attempts to gain access to devices at many different IP addresses. Let the number of receivers be drawn from a Poisson r.v. with parameter λ. These different receivers also have different capabilities to detect whether a login is malicious. Therefore, we consider that R has multiple types y ∈ Y . Let y = k denote a receiver type with no ability to detect deceptive logins (we say a weak receiver), and let y = o (a strong receiver) and y = v (an active receiver) denote receiver types with some ability to detect deceptive logins 1 . Let the probability that each receiver belongs to each type y ∈ Y be denoted by q R (y).
In order to formalize these capabilities, for y ∈ Y, let δ R y (e | x, m) denote the probability that R of type y observes evidence e given the sender's real type x and the sender's action 2 m. In order to capture the idea that evidence is useless for R of type k, but useful for R of types o and v, we have
1 The difference between type o and type v is clarified later in the section. 2 If S plays m = w, then the interaction ends and δ R y does not matter. 
Equation (1) states that, for R of type k, the probability of suspicious evidence is the same whether S is legitimate or deceptive. On the other hand, Eq. (2) states that, for R of types o and v, the probability of suspicious evidence is higher when S is deceptive than when S is legitimate. 4) Receiver Belief and Action: R uses e in addition to m to update his belief about the type of S. Let µ R y (x | m, e) denote the likelihood with which R of each type y thinks that S is of type x, given S's action m and evidence e.
Using this belief, R chooses an action a ∈ A. We consider three actions. Let a = t denote a decision to trust S, i.e., to give S access to the device. Let a = g denote a decision to ignore S, i.e., to reject the login attempt but not do anything else to report suspicious behavior. Finally, let a = f denote the use of active defense against suspicious login activity. Active defense could include reporting the activity or attempting to shutdown a botmaster or CC server of the botnet. We assume that not all devices are capable of participating in active defense. Let R of type v represent those devices capable of active defense, and R of type o represent those devices not capable of active defense.
Finally, let c t , c g , and c f denote the count of receivers which choose to trust, ignore, and use active defense against the sender, respectively. Let c be a column vector containing c t , c g , and c f as entries. This column vector falls in the space Z(A), the set of all possible counts of each action.
B. Utility, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility
gives the utility of senders of each type x ∈ X for sending action m if the count of receivers which choose each action is given by c. Let the utility be zero if S withdraws: U S x (w, c) = 0 for all x ∈ X and c ∈ Z(A).
Next, assume that the utility of each receiver does not depend directly on the actions of the other receivers. The receivers are still endogeneously coupled, since all of their strategies affect the optimal strategy of S. But there is no exogenous coupling. Define a vector-valued utility function for R by U R :
y (x, m, a) y ∈Y gives the utility of receivers of each type y ∈ Y if the sender's true type is x, the sender chooses action m, and the receiver chooses action y. This utility is zero if S withdraws. We also assume that it is zero if R chooses ignore (a = g). See Table  II for the full characteristics of the utility functions.
1) Mixed Strategies:
be a mixed strategy such that σ S l (m) gives the probability with which S of type l plays each action m ∈ M. Similarly, let σ
give the mixed-strategy probability with which S of type d plays each message m ∈ M. We take
gives the probability with which he plays action a after observing sender action m and evidence e. We also define a vector of the strategies of all the receiver types by σ R (a | m, e) = σ R y (a | m, e) y ∈Y ∈ Σ R . 2) Expected Utility Functions: Denote the expected utility of a sender of type x ∈ X byŪ S x : Σ S x × Σ R → R. Notice that the strategies of all receiver types must be taken into account. This expected utility is given bȳ
Here, P{c | σ R , x, m} is the probability with which c gives the count of receivers that play each action. Myerson shows that, due to the aggregation and decomposition properties of the Poisson r.v., c t , c g , and c f are also Poisson r.v. [15] , [16] . Therefore, P{c | σ R , x, m} is given by
where
In the next subsection, we will argue that the utility function of S is approximately linear in c. Because the expectation operator is also linear, we show in Appendix A that the expected utility function depends on the set of Poisson parameters λ a , a ∈ A, rather than on the whole pdf. Define the scalars ω t x , ω g x , and ω f x such that, for all x ∈ X, ω f x < ω g x < 0 < ω t x . These scalars represent the magnitude of the utility that S of type x ∈ X receives for each receiver who plays trust, ignore, and active defense, respectively, when S participates.
Next, define the expected utility of a receiver of type y ∈ Y byŪ R y : Σ R y → R, such that
gives the utility that R expects for using mixed strategy σ R y when S plays m, R observes evidence e, he forms belief µ R y (x | m, e) about whether S has each of the possible sender types x ∈ X.
C. Denial of Cyber-Physical Service Attacks
PDoS attacks cause damage to the physical component of a CPS. Therefore, knowledge of the CPS is required to approximate the utility functions of the PSG. Of course, power generation and distribution networks are complex. In order to focus on the game-theoretic model here, we use a simple utility function as a foundation for future work, and we focus on identifying when the model applies.
First, note that PDoS attacks are not limited to HVAC systems. We have already given examples of attacks on traffic patterns influenced by the Wayz navigation app and on emergency medical response influenced by fall detection in smart lighting systems. In other words, our contribution to consider general PDoS attacks does not depend on the specific implementation details of HVAC control.
Within HVAC control, though, a sudden power load could affect voltage regulation in a smart grid in multiple ways. Clearly, power regulation becomes highly non-linear when generator safeguards trip and cascading failures occur. But less severe load regulation is a day-to-day occurrence. In typical operating ranges, load can be shed or possibly relocated [14] . We approximate the cost of regulation by a function that is linear in the amount of excess load caused by infected IoT devices. Specifically, we have used the coefficient ω t d to represent the utility cost created by one IoT HVAC device which is infected and used in a PDoS attack. This approximation is limited to ranges near typical operating loads.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the relevant equilibrium concept for PSG. Then we obtain the equilibrium results by parameter region. Lastly, we present an algorithm by which devices use the equilibrium results to choose their actions.
A. Equilibrium Concept for PSG
An equilibrium of a game is a profile of strategies for all players, in which the strategy of each player is optimal given the strategies of the other players. Equilibria, therefore, model deadlocks between rational players.
PSG are dynamic games of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) is an appropriate concept for these games. Bayesian means that players (i.e., R) who lack information (i.e., x) maintain beliefs (i.e., µ R y (x)) for which their strategies are optimal. The term perfect requires beliefs to ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , a ∈ A, c ∈ Z (A), S and R get zero utility if S withdraws.
R lose (gain) utility from trusting a deceptive (legitimate) S.
Weak R have no ability to differentiate between types of S.
Other R have some ability to differentiate between types of S.
R which are not active types prefer not to use active defense.
Active R gain (lose) utility for active defense against a deceptive (legitimate) S.
be updated rationally based on the actions of the other players. This forces each strategy to be optimal for all subgames of the interaction (c.f. [7] ). Definition 1 applies PBNE to the PSG.
be given by Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), respectively. Then strategy profile and belief (σ S * , σ R * , µ R ) is a PBNE of the PSG if Eq. (7-11) hold.
∀y, m, e ∈ Y × M × E, σ R * y ∈ arg max
In addition, we have
B. Narrowing the Equilibrium Search
In order to simplify analysis, without loss of generality (wlog), let the utility functions be the same for all receiver types (except when a = f ), i.e.,
Also wlog, let the quality of the detectors for types y ∈ {o, v} be the same:
∀e ∈ E, x ∈ X, δ o (e | x, p) = δ v (e | x, p).
1) Parameter Assumptions:
We now obtain equilibria under natural assumptions on the PSG parameters. First, assume that legitimate senders always participate: σ S l (p) = 1. This is natural for our application, because IoT HVAC users will always attempt to login.
Second, assume that R of all types trust login attempts which appear to be legitimate (i.e., give evidence e = n). This is satisfied for
Third, we consider the likely behavior of R of type o when a login attempt is suspicious. Assume that he will ignore, rather than trust, the login. This occurs under the parameter regime
using the shorthand notatioñ
The fourth assumption addresses the action of R of type v when a login attempt is suspicious. The optimal action depends on his belief
The belief, in turn, depends on the mixed-strategy probability with which deceptive S participate. Intuitively, if σ (p) for which R should ignore (a = g) the login attempt. This is satisfied if 3
This simplifies analysis, but can be removed if necessary.
2) Equilibrium Strategies from Eq. (12) (13) (14) : Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium results thus far. Legitimate S participate. R which do not use active defense ignore suspicious login attempts. All receiver types trust login attempts which appear legitimate. R of type k, since he cannot differentiate between login attempts, trusts all of them. The proof follows from the optimality conditions in Eq. (7-11) and the assumptions in Eq. (12) (13) (14) . (12-14) hold, then the following equilibrium strategies are implied: (p) depends on whether R of type o and type v will ignore and/or use active defense to oppose suspicious login attempts.
C. Region Boundaries
The remaining equilibrium strategies fall into four parameter regions. In order to delineate these regions, we define two quantities.
Let
, then the receiver uses active defense with some probability. Equation (8) can be used to show that
where we have used the shorthand notation:
Next, define the quantity BP
This is the benefit which S of type d receives for choosing m = p, i.e., for participating in the interaction. If this benefit is negative, then S will withdraw. Let BP
, a v denote the benefit of participating when receivers use the pure strategies:
D. Equilibrium Strategies
We now have Theorem 1, which predicts the risk of malware infection in the remaining parameter regions. The proof is in Appendix B. Table III. 1) Equilibrium 1: Strong and active receivers ignore suspicious login attempts. But this is not enough to deter deceptive senders from participating. This is a poor equilibrium, because σ (• | t, g, g) < 0, which means that the cost of being ignored is sufficient to deter deceptive S. R of types o and v ignore with probability
and trust with probability
Deceptive S participate with reduced probability
4) Equilibrium 4: Here, being ignored is not enough to deter deceptive S from participating fully. Since q S (d) > T D R v , though, R of type v use active defense. This is enough to drive 
R of type v uses active defense with probability
and otherwise ignores the login attempt:
Equilibrium 1 and Equilibrium 2 are poor results because infection of devices is not deterred at all. The focus of Section IV will be to shift the PBNE to the other equilibrium regions, in which infection of devices is deterred to some degree.
E. Decision Algorithm for IoT Devices
Recall that we consider a type of brute force attack model (similar to Mirai), in which malware scans a range of IP addresses and tries a list of factory-default usernames and passwords. R of type y = k model those IoT devices which do not use strong passwords. We assume that they will be infected.
Instead, we focus on proactive defense mechanisms which are addressed to strong and active receivers. In the status quo, these devices ignore malicious login attempts. One of our defense mechanisms will incentivize R of type y = v to use active defense against the malicious logins that they detect.
Using Algorithm 1, devices can leverage the PSG equilibrium to decide upon which action to play. The algorithm uses a fundamental way of gathering evidence: tracking consecutive failed login attempts. In general, devices can rely on more specialized routines to detect malware, such as examining timing, source IP, duration, etc. Algorithm 1 is feasible particularly for the simple brute force attacks that we envision.
Line 2 states that type k receivers (IoT HVAC devices) have implemented either no passwords or default passwords. Therefore, in the worst case, they play trust immediately.
Type o and type v receivers have implemented stronger passwords. In Line 4, they prompt the user (S) for the password. 
2)
Up to τ attempts are allowed. If the user inputs the correct password before exhausting her attempts, then e = n, i.e., the login attempt appears to be legitimate. If the user exhausts the attempts, then we set e = b, i.e., the login appears suspicious.
Next, based on e, Line 6 and Line 7 choose the best actions for R of types o and v, respectively. Of course, for cases where the optimal strategy σ R * o or σ R * v is a mixed strategy, the receiver is completely indifferent between the actions over which he mixes. Practically speaking, both actions are optimal. The probabilistic actions in Algorithm 1 can be seen as equilibrium frequencies of the whole population of receivers.
Note that the repetition of login attempts achieves two purposes. First, it decreases the false-positive rate of the detector. Second, it filters out login attempts from parties which are unauthorized but not actively malicious 4 . Allowing τ login attempts prompts mistaken users to stop attempting access before triggering an alert. Table III, . Plot (b) shows that σ
IV. MECHANISM DESIGN

S * d
(p) is reduced, but only to a fixed probability, because as q R (o) increases, R of y ∈ {o, v} decrease the rate at which they ignore login attempts (c). 
A. Legislating Basic Security
Malware which infects IoT devices is successful because many IoT devices are poorly secured. Therefore, one mechanism design idea is to legally require better authentication methods, in order to decrease q R (k) and increase q R (o). Figure 4 depicts the results. Plot (a) shows that decreasing q R (k) and increasing q R (o) moves the game from Equilibrium 1 to Equilibrium 3. But Plot (b) shows that this only causes a fixed decrease in σ S * d (p), regardless of the amount of decrease in q R (k). Plot (c) shows the reason. As q R (o) increases, it is incentive-compatible for receivers to ignore messages with progressively lower probability σ R * y (g | p, b), y ∈ {o, v}. Rather than forcing deceptive S to withdraw, increasing q R (o) only decreases the incentive for receivers to ignore suspicious login attempts.
B. Incentivizing Active Defense
Another reason for the proliferation of IoT malware is that most devices which are secure (i.e., R of type y = o) do not take any actions against malicious login attempts except to ignore them (i.e., to play a = g). But there is almost no cost to malware scanners for making a large number of login attempts which are ignored. There is a lack of economic pressure which would force σ S * d (p) < 1, unless q R (0) is almost 1. Therefore, another design approach to incentivize a small number of IoT devices to use active defense. At the least, this includes denying login attempts after a number of failed passwords. It could also include gathering data about the attack to mitigate its effectiveness on other devices, or reporting the malicious activity to an ISP upstream of the attacker. Figure 5 shows the effect of providing an incentive U R v (d, p, f ) for active defense. This incentive moves the game from Equilibrium 1 to either Equilibrium 2 or Equilibrium 3, depending on whether BP 
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this section, we summarize the principle insights of the paper, and then we note areas for future work. First, we argue that the defender can bound the activity level of the botnet.
